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Abstract
Organ donation after cessation of circulation and respiration, both controlled and uncontrolled,
has been proposed by the Institute of Medicine as a way to increase opportunities for organ
procurement. Despite claims to the contrary, both forms of controlled and uncontrolled donation
after cardiac death raise significant ethical and legal issues. Identified causes for concern include
absence of agreement on criteria for the declaration of death, nonexistence of universal guidelines
for duration before stopping resuscitation efforts and techniques, and assumption of presumed
intent to donate for the purpose of initiating temporary organ-preservation interventions when no
expressed consent to donate is present. From a legal point of view, not having scientifically valid
criteria of cessation of circulation and respiration for declaring death could lead to a conclusion
that organ procurement itself is the proximate cause of death. Although the revised Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act of 2006 provides broad immunity to those involved in organ-procurement
activities, courts have yet to provide an opinion on whether persons can be held liable for injuries
arising from the determination of death itself. Preserving organs in uncontrolled donation after
cardiac death requires the administration of life-support systems such as extracorporeal membrane
oxygenation. These life-support systems can lead to return of signs of life that, in turn, have to be
deliberately suppressed by the administration of pharmacological agents. Finally, allowing
temporary organ-preservation interventions without expressed consent is inherently a violation of
the principle of respect for a person's autonomy. Proponents of organ donation from uncontrolled
donation after cardiac death, on the other hand, claim that these nonconsensual interventions
enhance respect for autonomy by allowing people, through surrogate decision making, to execute
their right to donate organs. However, the lack of transparency and the absence of protection of
individual autonomy, for the sake of maximizing procurement opportunities, have placed the
current organ-donation system of opting-in in great jeopardy. Equally as important, current policies
enabling and enhancing organ procurement practices, pose challenges to the constitutional rights
of individuals in a pluralistic society as these policies are founded on flawed medical standards for
declaring death.
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Introduction
Since the first kidney transplant in 1954, transplantation
has been an area of medicine of utmost complexity and
has often been a polarizing one as well [1]. Nevertheless,
as of April 17, 2009, the United Network for Organ Shar-
ing and Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network
reported that 101,761 persons are waiting for organ trans-
plantation, and this number continues to grow [2]. To
increase the number of organs available for transplanta-
tion, major initiatives have been implemented, and new
strategies are being developed. Before 1968, organs were
procured exclusively from donors with cardiorespiratory
failure, ie, non-heart-beating organ donation. The Har-
vard Ad Hoc Committee subsequently defined irreversible
coma as "brain death," equating "brain death" with
human death and, in so doing, opened the way to procure
organs from heart-beating donors [3]. Because of the
increasing number of patients in need of organs for trans-
plantation and the subsequent growing disparity between
supply and demand for transplantable organs [4], the US
Department of Health and Human Services asked the
Institute of Medicine (IOM) to form a committee with the
charge to conduct a review of proposals and efforts to
increase organ donation. This request was made in
response to the legislative requirements laid down in the
Organ Donation and Recovery Improvement Act of 2004.
The 2006 IOM Committee was charged with the develop-
ment of strategies to improve organ-donation rates, taking
into consideration ethical implications, possible impact
on public perceptions, cost-effectiveness, feasibility, and
practicality of implementing such proposals [5]. The
Committee proposed to expand the pool of potential
donors, postulating that out of the roughly 335,000
annual deaths by cardiac arrest, at least 22,000 individuals
would meet the criteria for uncontrolled donation after
cardiac death (uDCD). In controlled DCD, circulatory
arrest follows consented removal of mechanical ventila-
tion and hemodynamic support from a critically ill
patient, who cannot be declared "brain dead" and meets
specific cardiocirculatory criteria for death after life sup-
port is taken away [6]. uDCD involves procuring organs
from patients either in whom unsuccessful resuscitation
efforts are terminated in the field or the emergency depart-
ment or after they being brought to the hospital dead on
arrival [7]. uDCD raises ethical and legal concerns similar
to those in controlled DCD, some of which have been pre-
viously addressed, including lack of scientific validation
of (1) the current circulatory criteria for determining
death and (2) the standard medical tests used to confirm
that uniform criteria of death are fulfilled [8-10]. Other
ethical and legal concerns specific to uDCD include (1)
the absence of universal guidelines that determine dura-
tion before resuscitation efforts are stopped; (2) presumed
authority in the absence of first-person consent to initiate
temporary organ-preservation (TOP) techniques; (3) the
administration of advanced, highly invasive preservation
techniques; and (4) the potential for conflicts of obliga-
tion, loyalty, and interests among the stakeholders. These
conflicts revolve around the responsibility to secure the
best interest of the patient (within the context of the tradi-
tional physician-patient relationship) versus ensuring the
health of the donor's organs for an anticipated recipient
(within the context of the organ harvester-donor relation-
ship) before the patient has become a donor. All of these
concerns must be addressed and resolved to avoid any fur-
ther erosion of public's trust in the integrity of medical
practice.
The criteria of circulatory death
The validity of controlled DCD protocols [11] have been
called into question, with opponents focusing on the
notion of irreversibility incorporated in the Uniform Deter-
mination of Death Act of 1981 [8,9]. The Uniform Deter-
mination of Death Act defines death as either (1)
irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory func-
tions or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the
entire brain, including the brain stem [12]. In uDCD,
compliance with the Dead Donor Rule (DDR) is even fur-
ther compromised by the absence of resuscitation guide-
lines and the implications of using advanced, highly
invasive organ-preservation techniques. The DDR refers to
2 ethical and legal norms governing the practice of organ
procurement. The first stipulates that organs can only be
taken from dead persons. The second prohibits the killing
of patients for or by organ procurement. The DDR pre-
vents the killing of one person for organs that would save
the lives of others.
Although the Uniform Determination of Death Act specif-
ically uses the word irreversible, the IOM argues that com-
pliance with the DDR in DCD protocols is ensured
because "irreversible" (ie, spontaneous life functions can-
not be restored by current medical technology) is com-
monly understood as "permanent" (ie, spontaneous life
functions will not be restored because current medical
technology will not be used) [5,13]. The IOM follows Ber-
nat's argument that clinical practice commonly refers to
the notion of "permanence" rather than to "irreversibil-
ity." Permanence "represents an earlier stage of an inevita-
ble process that rapidly and with complete certainty yields
irreversibility" [14]. Permanence is considered as the
absolute prognosis of irreversibility. Others contend that
although the word permanence may convey the absolute
accuracy of the "prognosis," it certainly is not synony-
mous to the determination or diagnosis of death [9,15].
Considering that, in the typical (ie, outside the domain of
organ procurement) clinical setting, physicians take their
time in pronouncing death, it may be less clear how per-
manence differs from irreversibility; however, in the con-
text of DCD, when the transplant community andPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:15 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/15
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professional organizations advocating transplantation are
anxious to pronounce death at the earliest possible point,
this difference is critical [16-18].
Neither permanence nor irreversibility is an empirical
concept and cannot be empirically determined. Both
destruction of the brain and the cessation of its functions
are directly observable. Permanence and irreversibility are
properties about which we can learn only by inference
from prior experience. They are not observable condi-
tions. Hence, they cannot serve as evidence, nor can they
rightly be made part of an empirical criterion of death.
Destruction of the brain is what convinces us of perma-
nence and irreversibility. But, if there is no proof of com-
plete destruction, then any declaration that a cessation of
function is absolutely permanent or irreversible is a pre-
sumption, even if well grounded, that is contingent on the
current state of medical knowledge and on the availability
of adequate life-support systems in the concrete circum-
stances. Right or wrong, a presumption of permanence or
irreversibility of a lack of brain function is insufficient
ground for removing a patient's vital organs or for imme-
diate autopsy, cremation, or burial. "To regard the [per-
manence or] irreversibility of cessation of brain function
(at best, a deduction from a set of symptoms) as synony-
mous or interchangeable with destruction of the entire
brain (one but not the only possible cause of these symp-
toms) is to commit a compound fallacy: identifying the
symptoms with their cause and assuming a single cause
when several are possible" [19].
The notion of irreversibility has been further challenged
by the decision of the Health Resources and Services
Administration of the Department of Health and Human
Services and the Organ Procurement and Transplantation
Network in 2007 to include extracorporeal membrane
oxygenation (ECMO), as well as bronchoscopy, as dona-
tion-related procedures in DCD (figure 1) [20]. These
donation-related procedures can reverse the circulatory
and respiratory criteria used for declaring death and organ
procurement [21]. Organ-preservation techniques in
uDCD have evolved from the use of cooling blankets, the
insertion of catheters in the femoral artery and vein, and
the introduction of cooling solution through the arterial
catheter into the abdominal cavity to more extensive and
Organ-donation-related procedures for temporary organ preservation in donation after cardiac death Figure 1
Organ-donation-related procedures for temporary organ preservation in donation after cardiac death. The 
Health Resources and Services Administration of the Department of Health and Human Services and the Organ Procurement 
and Transplantation Network bylaws include extracorporeal membrane oxygenation with a cardiopulmonary bypass machine 
(artificial heart-lung apparatus), as well as bronchoscopy, as donation-related procedures for organ preservation in donation 
after cardiac death [20]. The use of a cardiopulmonary bypass machine (artificial heart-lung apparatus) is initiated for the artifi-
cial circulation of oxygenated blood necessary for organ preservation, which reverses the circulatory criterion of death. Tra-
cheal intubation and lung insufflations are required for bronchoscopy (permission to reproduce the figure was obtained from 
Springer Science and Business Media [21]).Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:15 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/15
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invasive procedures. These include the use of automated
chest-compression devices, the reinstitution of mechani-
cal ventilation, and the transportation to hospitals for the
initiation of normothermic ECMO. Artificial support of
circulation with cardiopulmonary bypass and reintuba-
tion for lung ventilation, however, can resuscitate these
patients during organ procurement. Resuscitated patients
who are designated as donors then require pharmacolog-
ical agents, aortic occlusion of coronary and cerebral cir-
culation, or both to suppress spontaneously returned
cardiac activities and neurological functions [22,23].
Studies have shown the effectiveness of ECMO and cardi-
opulmonary bypass for the return of full neurological
functioning after prolonged refractory circulatory arrest
[24-26], attesting to the resilience of the human brain to
cessation of short periods of circulatory arrest [27,28].
Any claim that criteria in uDCD mirror traditional death,
ie, absence of respiration, circulation, and consciousness,
appears unsubstantiated. Studies have shown that the use
of ECMO in cardiac patients unresponsive to cardiopul-
monary resuscitation can result in a 31.6% survival to
hospital discharge [29]. Declaring patients dead before
initiating ECMO (as in uDCD) can deprive some patients
of the chance of survival and full recovery. Therefore, not
only is it that no universal guidelines exist that identify the
duration until resuscitative efforts are stopped, but also "it
is how you get resuscitated that determines if your death
is irreversible" [30], although there can never be return to
life after true death.
The use of ECMO makes the conclusion even more likely
that patients enrolled in DCD protocols are not actually
dead at the time of organ procurement which violates the
DDR [31-34]. The probability of return of signs of life or
the need for suppression of signs of life during surgical
procurement would make the act of procurement an act of
homicide or mercy killing [16-18]. This medical practice
conflicts with how the Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Services defines a DCD individual in 42cfr486.302--"an
individual who donates after his or her heart has irrevers-
ibly stopped beating" [35]. We have previously argued
that, if organs are indeed removed from persons without
compliance with the legal definition of death outlined in
the Uniform Determination of Death Act [36], then
enforcement of federal policies and state legislations pro-
moting such an activity can also be construed as a direct
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution (1868): "No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The Health
Resources and Services Administration's endorsement of
the use of ECMO is opposite to what the US Congress
intended from 42 USC section 1441: to prevent using fed-
eral funds encouraging activities such as assisted suicide,
euthanasia, and mercy killing [37].
Presumed authority to initiate TOP techniques
In the context of uDCD, one critical question in a system
of expressed consent is how to address the need for organ
preservation when a potential donor dies unexpectedly
and no proof of recorded expression of donor status is
available. Can there be an ethical warrant for undertaking
TOP techniques under such conditions? The IOM recom-
mended that community authorization (ie, a switch from
expressed to presumed consent) is to be obtained "for the
use of postmortem organ preservation techniques during
the time needed to seek family consent for donation when
the decedent's intention is unknown" [5]. Note that post-
mortem never can be premortem. To justify presumed
consent for TOP, the IOM postulates that there is broad
public support for the premise that "a presumption of
consent to use preservation techniques enhances rather
than limits autonomy by enabling a decision about
whether to donate; absent such presumed permission, the
opportunity to donate is irretrievably lost" [5]. Since then,
some members of the IOM have expressed doubts about
the need for language of presumed consent for TOP, argu-
ing instead that current law already allows such interven-
tions. In addition, the IOM describes TOP as a brief,
modestly invasive procedure that enhances rather than
limits autonomy. This rationale is by itself thought suffi-
cient to justify TOP [13]. Some proponents go one step
further embracing the view that it may be even obligatory
to preserve the deceased person's organs for a reasonable
time while consent for donation from a responsible fam-
ily member is being sought [38]. In conclusion, the IOM's
position rests on the premise that TOP (1) is brief and
modestly invasive, (2) enhances autonomy, and (3) is
sanctioned by current law. However, the length of time for
TOP is nonspecific and depends on how quickly a surro-
gate decision maker can be located, how fast consent for
organ procurement can be obtained, or how long it takes
for refusal of donation to be accepted by organ procure-
ment organization (OPO) personnel. Furthermore, place-
ment of any foreign material, such as a temporary catheter
into a blood vessel or a body cavity, or infusion of any
type of solution or medication into a person's blood
stream is considered invasive in everyday medical prac-
tice. Finally, although the IOM did not recommend
ECMO in its 2006 report, since then, the use of this tech-
nology has quickly become mainstream in medical prac-
tice and has been recommended in practice guidelines for
controlled DCD organ procurement for transplantation
[39]. Its use in uDCD protocols, though, remains contro-
versial.Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:15 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/15
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The argument that presumed consent for organ preserva-
tion enhances autonomy seems odd, although it effec-
tively obscures the utilitarian objectives of DCD. It is odd
because respect for autonomy is the primary reason for
having a system of informed consent in medical practice.
To argue that autonomy is enhanced by violating it in the
first place appears illogical, particularly when utilitarian
priorities rather than the best interests of the patient even
when he or she is considered to be a potential donor, are
disproportionately represented in the consenting process
for organ procurement. In other words, a physician pre-
suming consent must intend to promote and materialize
the best interests of the patient. In the same manner, a sur-
rogate decision maker must intend to act in accordance
with that same objective. Transplant professionals imple-
menting TOP under the assumption of "presumed con-
sent" are eroding the DDR for a hypothetical "opportunity
to donate" that benefits others but not the dying patient.
The opportunity to donate does not serve the patient qua
patient, unless the patient's consent to donation is genu-
inely and freely expressed (with full decision-making
capacity), a condition not normally achieved in a vulner-
able "donating" population, where "presumption" rules.
In regard to organ donation, the US has in place a system
of expressed consent or opting in. It can be argued that
such a system introduces a problem when expressed con-
sent to donation is absent and the risk of losing organs for
transplantation must be minimized. In most other cir-
cumstances in which expressed consent is legally required,
however, ie, legal documents such as wills and contracts,
absence of consent entails no consent. Considering the
objective to maximize procurement opportunities, it is
believed important to reduce the risk of loss of transplant-
able organs. The legitimate question is then how society
should legally deal with absent consent to donate. It is
reasonable to assume that at least some who did not pro-
vide expressed consent to donate did so because of rea-
sons other than dissent. In those cases, presumed intent to
donate and the initiation of TOP would mean that the
person's autonomy is being protected, although unknow-
ingly. There are others who intentionally have not con-
sented but did not have a way to document refusal. In
these cases, TOP would violate their right to autonomy. It
would be equally valid to argue that enhancement of
autonomy is better served by assuming that all who did
not consent did so with intent. Suggestions that, in the
absence of mandatory informed decision making, an
opportunity for surrogate informed decision making
should be allowed because of presumed uncertainty
about whether individuals, prior to the unanticipated
condition, may have wanted to change the donation deci-
sion, might also undermine the autonomy of those indi-
viduals who did not express consent based on a reflective
informed decision not to donate. An additional argument
against allowing presumed intent is that, in all other situ-
ations in life, granting second-opportunity contemplation
is not an option and would have serious implications, for
instance, for the legal system. Once someone commits a
crime, the legal system does not give a person a second
chance by arguing that, by being given a second opportu-
nity, the person's autonomy will be enhanced and better
decisions might be made. Other commentators have
argued that surrogate consent in DCD should not be
allowed as consent is unlikely to be based on a best-inter-
est analysis, "even if the adult wanted to be an organ
donor, because the incompetent adult's condition will not
improve as a result of the interventions" [40] or even the
evaluations to declare "brain death" by apnea testing.
Respect for a person's autonomy requires respect for the
person's decision not to register as an organ donor, evi-
denced by the absence of registration information. To pre-
sume donation intent, even when a person is not
registered as a donor, to allow time to confirm nonregis-
tration or to second guess the autonomous decision of
nondonors, is inconsistent with other moral and legal
practices in society. If the objective is to enhance individ-
ual autonomy, it seems that a system of mandated
informed decision making would be a better-suited
model. It would require everyone to express their autono-
mously made informed decision about organ donation
and that decisions be recorded in easily accessible regis-
tries [8].
Potential for conflicts of obligation, loyalty, and 
interests
The disparity between the supply and the demand for
transplantable organs has triggered a variety of initiatives
to increase the number of organs available for transplan-
tation. In all of these initiatives, the interests of 2 impor-
tant stakeholders are of concern in DCD, (1) the patients
designated as potential or prospective donors and (2) the
persons in need of a transplantable organ [13]. It must be
recognized that, although both groups should be consid-
ered to be primary stakeholders, other agents have critical
interests as well. Among those are OPOs, medical institu-
tions, pharmaceutical companies, and individual provid-
ers associated with transplantation practice. Financial
incentives, institutional and professional prestige, and the
belief that the saving of human lives allows for moral
boundaries to be pushed out are in play as well [41].
Transplant advocates exploit the term "organ shortage" to
gain public support for implementing policies that can
have serious sociocultural and legal consequences. The
term organ shortage " [seems] to be based on the situation
formed from the point of views of demand, that is, of
(former, potential or prospective) recipients that there is a
demand-driven market for organs, and thus takes side
with the perspectives, interests and concerns of only onePhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:15 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/15
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of the parties involved on organ donation" [42]. This
biased approach becomes apparent in the limited infor-
mation disclosure in public surveys about scientific, ethi-
cal and medical concerns regarding death declaration in
procurement practices, subsequently perpetuating dis-
torted views of the consequences of a nonconsensual TOP
policy for the principal stakeholders, ie, persons desig-
nated as potential donors [43]. Regardless of the wide
variety of interests, policy making has focused predomi-
nantly on facilitating procurement processes and maxi-
mizing opportunities for what is still called organ
donation. Federal regulations require Medicare-approved
hospitals and transplant centers to have in place policies
and procedures for DCD [44]. In all of the policy activi-
ties, the interests of patients who are designated as poten-
tial donors and their families appear to have lower
priority. As we indicated earlier, others have argued,
instead, that contemporary policies strengthen donors'
interests by firming up donors' autonomy [5].
The Department of Health and Human Services
announced, in 2003, the formation of the Organ Dona-
tion Breakthrough Collaborative, which in turn created 58
national donation service areas to organize the transplant
community across the United States [45]. The goal of the
Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative is for hospi-
tals within each donation service area to reach a target
cadaveric organ donation rate of 75% or higher. The Uni-
form Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) was revised in 2006 in
accordance with the controlling federal regulation section
42 CFR §482.45 mandating hospitals to notify the OPOs
in each donation service area when a person's death is
imminent or has occurred for possible organ and tissue
procurement [46]. The revised UAGA sections 14c and
21b create the default rule of initiation and/or continua-
tion of life-support systems for organ preservation until
the evaluation of medical suitability of organs for trans-
plantation has been completed and overriding a prospec-
tive donor's expression not to have life prolonged by life-
support systems unless an expression of contrary intent is
documented [47]. Sections 14c and 21b have been justi-
fied based on the federal mandate of referring all hospital
patients at the end of life for possible organ and tissue
procurement. The federal mandate is put in place despite
the fact that life-support systems are necessary for preserv-
ing organs at the end of life and can inflict unwarranted
traumatic and distressing experiences to patients seem-
ingly close to death but still living and to their families
[48]. The rationale for this decision is clarified in the1987
amendments of the UAGA: encouraging organ donation
is the primary purpose [46]. The drafters of the UAGA
went so far as to include a good-faith immunity clause to
protect medical personnel from civil and criminal liability
for efforts they make to comply with the Act. To further
promote organ donation and not to frustrate the underly-
ing goal of the Act, physicians, hospital staff, and others
are encouraged to read the Act liberally [38]. Under the
heading of continuous quality improvement, the use of
the Rapid Assessment of Hospital Procurement Barriers in
Donation has been proposed [49]. This quality-improve-
ment program measures compliance of the hospital staff
with procurement policies and procedures; it recom-
mends implementation of "corrective" interventions to
change attitudes and behaviors deemed necessary to
improve the rate of organ procurement, and it raises the
possibility of future punitive action against hospitals
assigned a "poor" rating. The Rapid Assessment of Hospi-
tal Procurement Barriers in Donation program aims to
mold the psychosocial characteristics of the hospital
staffs' knowledge of and adherence to policies regarding
donation, patient advocacy, and the hospital-OPO rela-
tionship to create a greater compatibility with nationally
used strategies that optimize organ procurement.
Federal regulations also mandate that discussing organ
donation must be initiated by a certified procurement
coordinator, a situation that, in turn, creates a potential
conflict between the medical team and procurement coor-
dinators [44]. Priorities and interests may collide when
the timing of these conversations with family members is
off. To foster a level of trust with family members of
potential donors, OPOs, consistent with the Organ Dona-
tion Breakthrough Collaborative guidelines, have used a
collaborative approach (ie, "team huddle program") link-
ing procurement coordinators with the medical team
responsible for patient care at an early stage after hospital
admission and before making end-of-life decisions
[50,51]. However, team huddling, particularly in circum-
stances of great emotional distress, can also contribute to
increased confusion for families: who is who and whose
interests do they represent?
In a civil case (Jacobs v. The Center for Organ Recovery &
Education and others) in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania, a wrongful death
suit was filed by the parents of Gregory Jacobs in March of
2009 [52]. Plaintiffs claim that 18-year-old Gregory was
intentionally killed at the hospital so that his organs could
be harvested. Gregory sustained a head injury while snow-
boarding. The suit alleges that he "experienced neither a
cessation of cardiac activity nor a cessation of brain activ-
ities when surgeons began the procedures for removing
his vital organs. But for the intentional trauma or asphyx-
iation of Gregory Jacobs, he would have lived, or, at the
very least, his life would have been prolonged." In addi-
tion, the plaintiffs claim that the organ-procurement coor-
dinator and the physicians involved agreed to mislead
Gregory's parents into believing that Gregory was "brain
dead" and had no chance of survival so that they could
harvest his organs. Gregory's father was told that GregoryPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:15 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/15
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was "brain dead." The case alleges that the defendants
knew that this was false but communicated this to con-
vince Gregory's father to give consent for organ donation.
The OPO representations, through the coordinator,
according to the complaint, were fraudulent and decep-
tive, resulting in confusion and misunderstanding,
thereby violating the Unfair Trade Practices and Con-
sumer Protection Law. This case illustrates how confusing
and potentially deceptive (real or perceived) the interac-
tions with OPO coordinators can be. The concept of team
huddling may create only the perception of a trustworthy
relationship, which could easily result in the destruction
of (public) trust in the long run. The immunity clause in
the UAGA may protect against allegations of wrongful
death. It is unclear, however, whether persons can be held
liable for injuries arising from the determination of death
itself [53]. Considering what is outlined above, it seems
that the interests of all stakeholders appear to have
received high priority, except for the interests of the
donor. Physicians caring for critically ill patients may
therefore be placed in a position of considerable moral
conflict [30]. This moral conflict pertains to patient-care
decisions for the potential donor, including decisions to
stop resuscitation interventions and end-of-life care, and
pressures due to, among others, institutional performance
expectations and regulatory compliance.
Conclusion
The practice of DCD in general is problematic because of
the absence of an agreement on criteria for declaring death
and guidelines for duration to stop resuscitation efforts
and techniques. From a legal point of view, the organ pro-
curement itself could be viewed as the proximate cause of
death. Although the revised UAGA of 2006 provides
broad immunity to those involved in organ-procurement
activities, courts in the United States have yet to provide
an opinion on whether persons can be held liable for inju-
ries arising from the determination of death itself. Preserv-
ing organs requires the administration of life-support
systems such as ECMO that could contribute to the return
of signs of life that, in turn, have to be deliberately sup-
pressed pharmacologically. Finally, allowing TOP is
inherently a violation of the principle of respect for a per-
son's autonomy, which it claims to enhance.
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